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CONSTITUTIONAL REDUCTIONISM, RAWLS,
AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Abner S. Greene*
INTRODUCTION
There is an important debate afoot: Should we treat the
Constitution as positive law, to be respected and followed in its
specifics? Or must we read the Constitution by reducing its specific
textual markers to values that we then must discuss and elaborate
through a more openly normative and less law-like method? I call the
latter move one of "constitutional reductionism" and in my own work
I am caught on the horns of this dilemma.
The two examples with which I am most familiar both involve the
First Amendment. Take, first, the religion clauses. The First
Amendment begins-the Bill of Rights begins-by marking out
religion for two clauses all its own. (Well, that would actually be
conceding the battle to the positivists, so let's make "all its own" a
disputed issue.) "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'
One might think it a simple task to figure out how we must proceed,
interpretively. Of course it might sometimes be difficult to know what
comes within the domain "religion" and it might be difficult to
determine what counts as establishment and what counts as
prohibition of free exercise. But we would be operating throughout
by treating religion as distinctive: its establishment is prohibited, its
free exercise is guaranteed, and not anything else. So, if your claim is
that government is establishing a secular belief system or prohibiting
the free exercise of some secular tenets, you had better look
somewhere other than the religion clauses to ground your claim.
But, as it turns out, this is not the only view in town. The other
view-the constitutional reductionist view-says that the religion
clauses are mere markers of a deeper, or broader, value, or set of
values. Despite the undisputed fact that the First Amendment's text
treats religion as distinctive, the constitutional reductionists claim that
we should treat those textual markers as placeholders. One argument
is that they are placeholders for a general principle of equal regard:2
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
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Government must regard equally all of our beliefs, all of our belief
systems, and all of our methods of carrying out those beliefs and
systems. On this view, there is no special barrier to government's
erecting religious symbols on public property or grounding law in
predominantly, expressly religious argumentation. Either all of this is
fair game, as the erection of secular symbols would be, and as
grounding law in predominantly, expressly secular argumentation
would be, or we have to find a principle that would rule all of it out of
bounds. Obviously that won't work for the "what arguments may
ground law?" issue-we can't rule all arguments out of bounds-so all
are in bounds. The issue of symbols is trickier, however. The equal
regard theory supposes that there might be some instances of
government erection of secular symbols that would violate the
Establishment Clause, because government should not be putting its
imprimatur on any contested comprehensive belief system.
To treat religion as distinctive-to see the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses as setting up distinctive rules regarding government
treatment of religion-is to violate a principle of equality that the
reductionist theorists argue is the meta-principle we must respect.
Textual markers that appear distinctive must thus be unpacked to
reveal the broader, or deeper principles that they embody.
Now take the second example, the Free Speech Clause. The First
Amendment prohibits Congress from "abridging the freedom of
speech."3 Of course we'd have to discuss what counts as abridging,
and what counts as speech (not to mention what counts as the
freedom of speech), but those are all tasks within the bounds of
standard positive legal analysis. It is the freedom of speech that the
First Amendment is protecting, and not the freedom of (for example)
conduct. However, the constitutional reductionists look at the
problem differently:4 Speech can harm just as conduct can, and there
is nothing distinctive about speech that warrants distinctive treatment.
All of the standard arguments-speech as essential to democracy,
speech as key to the search for truth, speech as at the core of
autonomy, even speech as specially subject to partisan regulatory
shenanigans-fail to distinguish speech from other action that harms.
Thus, we must scrap the notion of speech as special and think about
the Free Speech Clause more generally as a textual marker of some
deeper, broader value, which value then must be protected whether or
not it is embodied in a speech act.
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1245 (1994); cf Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds
Between Church and State, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2255 (1997).
3. U.S. Const. amend. I.
4. See generally Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry
(1982); cf Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech: And It's a Good
Thing, Too (1994).
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I said at the outset that in my own work I am caught on the horns of
this dilemma. On the one hand, I have advanced one version of the
religion-as-distinctive argument. Religion, on my argument, is
different because it is based in an extrahuman source of normative
authority. That's what most religious people believe, and it makes
religious arguments distinctively inaccessible to nonbelievers.
Because of this, the Establishment Clause should be (and has been)
construed to bar legislation from being based on predominantly,
expressly religious arguments. But then we have imposed a distinctive
gag rule on religious folk, and Free Exercise Clause exemptions-
ordered by courts as of right, although legislatures may also act to
accommodate religion-are the counterweight to the Establishment
Clause gag rule. Just as we properly limit the role of religious
arguments in the lawmaking process, so must we limit the sovereignty
claims of law over religious practice.
This argument, which I call the political balance of the religion
clauses, is a normative one, but it is a normative defense of positive
law, of treating the First Amendment's text and its markers of religion
as distinctive. However, in current work, I have begun questioning
the very enterprise of constitutional obligation; questioning whether
we as citizens have a moral duty to obey the law, in our constitutional
order and more generally; questioning whether government officials
have any special duty to follow what the Supreme Court says about
the Constitution; and questioning whether anyone has a duty to follow
what the framers of text thought text meant, or, indeed, to follow the
plain meaning of text at all. My current project suggests that all-
things-considered normative judgments, about what law means and
about whether to follow purportedly canonical sources of law and
sources of the meaning of law, are always appropriate. This view
strongly suggests that constitutional reductionism is precisely the
correct method of doing constitutional law.
There is one way of reconciling the two positions I have taken. My
argument for the political balance of the religion clauses-for treating
the Establishment Clause as imposing a distinctive burden on religion
and the Free Exercise Clause as awarding distinctive exit options for
religion-can be seen not as a positivist defense of text, but rather as
what I believe to be the correct, all-things-considered normative
elaboration of the religion clauses. On this view, I disagree with those
who advance an equal regard theory of the Constitution not as a
matter of meta-theory-I do not disagree that we must always seek an
appealing normative understanding of constitutional text, even if that
means scrapping text-but rather I claim that the equal regard
theorists have gotten their normative analysis wrong. In this instance,
the textual markers of religion as distinctive have captured something
that is indeed normatively distinctive about religion.
Religion's distinctiveness requires us, either as a matter of First
2004] 2091
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Amendment interpretation or as a matter of political theory, to limit
the role of religion in lawmaking but then, as compensation, to limit
the sovereignty of law over religion. Although this view that there is a
political balance of the religion clauses has some affinities with
Rawls's view of public reason, there are significant differences as well.
In explaining, I will first describe Rawls's treatment of public reason.
Next I will lay out my conception of public reason and its
consequences. Finally I will use this different notion of public reason
and its consequences to critique Rawls's conception of public reason.'
I. RAWLS'S TREATMENT OF PUBLIC REASON
In A Theory of Justice,6 Rawls argued that in "a well-ordered
society" citizens would accept certain basic principles of justice-what
he calls justice as fairness-as a "comprehensive philosophical
doctrine."7 But "a political conception of justice" is different from a
comprehensive philosophical doctrine.8 People are unlikely to accept
unanimously one comprehensive doctrine as foundational; the
concept of a well-ordered society is "highly idealized."9
Rawls's project in Political Liberalism, therefore, was to elaborate
how people who differ in their comprehensive doctrines can
nonetheless accept common principles of justice. As he puts it, "the
problem of political liberalism is: How is it possible that there may
exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens
profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines?"'" According to Rawls, "the aim
of political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility of
a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political
questions."11
Rawls stresses the difference between comprehensive philosophical
liberalism and political liberalism throughout the book. The key point
is that whereas a comprehensive liberalism would take the position
that the moral order arises from human nature and society and that
each reasonable, conscientious person has access to that moral order,
political liberalism "does not take a general position on [these issues]
but leaves [them] to be answered in their own way by different
comprehensive views," merely affirming "[the liberal view] with
5. Much of the material that follows is drawn from Abner S. Greene, Uncommon
Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's Dominion by
Ronald Dworkin, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 646 (1994).
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999).
7. John Rawls, Political Liberalism xviii (1996) (discussing arguments put forth
previously in A Theory of Justice).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 35.
10. Id. at xx.
11. Id. at xxi.
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respect to a political conception of justice for a constitutional
democratic regime. ' 2  Thus, Rawls reserves the terms "religious,"
"philosophical," and "moral" for sectarian views of the good; he uses
the term "political" for conceptions that citizens might share even
though they differ in their comprehensive religious, philosophical, or
moral doctrines.
The centerpieces of the book are Rawls's discussions of overlapping
consensus and public reason. The solution to the problem of political
liberalism, says Rawls, is the development of an overlapping
consensus of various comprehensive doctrines through the practice of
public reason. 3 An overlapping consensus of divergent doctrines
does not depend, stresses Rawls, on balancing among the doctrines or
taking bits and pieces from each. 4 Rather, an overlapping consensus
can develop because "the reasonable doctrines endorse the political
conception, each from its own point of view."' 5  If an overlapping
consensus exists, consisting of the intersection of the reasonable
comprehensive doctrines in society, then citizens can accept this
shared political conception of justice as correct from the viewpoint of
their own comprehensive doctrines, recognize other comprehensive
views as reasonable (even if they think them mistaken), and accept
the absence of coercion to support their own comprehensive
doctrines. 6
The overlapping consensus must come about through public
reason-that is, through terms shared as citizens and not through
terms based in conceptions of the good grounded in comprehensive
philosophical, moral, or religious doctrines. Public reason involves
"following the usual guidelines of public inquiry and rules for
assessing evidence .... [T]hose guidelines and rules must be specified
by reference to forms of reasoning and argument available to citizens
generally, and so in terms of common sense, and by the procedures
and conclusions of science when not controversial. '1 7
The requirement of public reason applies most strongly to the
fundamental questions of justice, and perhaps more weakly to more
mundane political matters. 8 The limits of public reason do not apply
to personal deliberations or private associational matters, but they do
apply when we act as citizens in a public forum or when voting. And
they apply to public officials, and "in a special way to the judiciary."' 9
Public reason is a necessary condition for legitimate governmental
12. Id. at xxix; see also id. at 9-10, 95, 125-26, 144, 150-54, 176, 194-95, 209.
13. See id. at 10.
14. See id. at 39.
15. Id. at 134 (emphasis added); see also id. at 95, 147.
16. See id. at 127-28.
17. Id. at 162; see also id. at 224-25.
18. See id. at 214; see also id. at 227-30.
19. Id. at 216. Rawls refers to the Supreme Court as an "Exemplar of Public
Reason." Id. at 231.
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power because "our exercise of political power is proper and hence
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as
reasonable and rational."2 In other words:
[I]n recognizing others' comprehensive views as reasonable, citizens
also recognize that, in the absence of a public basis of establishing
the truth of their beliefs, to insist on their comprehensive view must
be seen by others as their insisting on their own beliefs. If we do so
insist, others in self-defense can oppose us as using upon them
unreasonable force. 21
Rawls states two exceptions to the requirement of public reason.
First, in a somewhat (but not completely) well-ordered society, it
might be appropriate on some hotly contested issues to refer in
politics to comprehensive doctrines, not to justify the outcome we
want but rather to assure others of the sincerity of our political
position.22 Second, in a not-well-ordered society that is fundamentally
unjust, the requirement of public reason may be suspended "as the
best way to bring about a well-ordered and just society in which the
ideal of public reason could eventually be honored.213 Rawls refers to
the requirement of public reason, as modified by these two
exceptions, as the "'inclusive view. "'24
In a later essay, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,25 Rawls
expands the inclusive view into what he deems "the wide view. 26
Here, he adds that "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or
nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any
time, provided that in due course proper political reasons-and not
reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines-are presented that
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines
introduced are said to support. ' 27  Rawls refers to this as "'the
proviso.' "28
20. Id. at 217; see also id. at 243.
21. Id. at 247.
22. See id. at 248-49.
23. Id. at 250.
24. Id. at 247.
25. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997), reprinted in John
Rawls: Collected Papers 573 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
26. Id. at 591.
27. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis omitted). He adds that by introducing comprehensive views
into the discussion, we gain information benefits from "mutual knowledge of one
another's religious and nonreligious doctrines." He also suggests that public reason is
merely an "ideal" and not a "legal duty," "for in that case it would be incompatible
with freedom of speech." Id. This seems wrong: We often limit speech in the name of
other values or to avoid certain harms. If our Establishment Clause, or principles of
political morality more generally, appropriately place a limit on reference to
comprehensive doctrines in the lawmaking process, then it is appropriate to deem this
2094 [Vol. 72
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II. PUBLIC REASON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Properly understood, the religion clauses of our Constitution
instantiate the following principles of political morality: (1) Laws
should not be based on references to sources of normative authority
to which citizens might reasonably believe they lack access; (2) If we
are to impose a gag rule of this sort, then we must compensate those
gagged through relaxing law's dominion, most likely through a system
of judicial exemptions and legislative accommodations.29
We should-and the Supreme Court has3 -enforce principle (1)
through the following rule: Laws may not be based on express,
predominant religious argumentation. Religious reference is different
in kind from any other type of reference, for it alone refers back to an
extrahuman source of normative authority. (Here I bracket the
possibility of nontheistic religion.) This is indeed what makes religion
important to many religious believers, i.e., that power over both
creation and the moral order rests outside human hands and minds.
But precisely because such belief involves a "reference out," it is
accessible in a different way from other forms of belief. Although
many belief systems involve hard work to understand them and see
their implications, they still involve reference to shared human
observations, evidence, etc. Religious belief and its ensuing (claimed)
moral and sometimes legal entailments can be understood by
nonbelievers, but the animating source of value cannot be accessed in
the way that other tenets can be. I am not claiming that "faith" has no
role in nonreligious reasoning, nor that religion lacks reasoning to
move from animating theistic belief to moral/legal demands. The
point is, perhaps, simpler: that for religious people and nonreligious
people alike, what is special about religion is precisely the extrahuman
source of normative authority that underlies religion but not anything
else.
The inaccessibility of such animating authority means that we
should not base our laws on it. Express references to such religious
authority in our lawmaking process exclude nonbelievers from full
participation in the process. Note two things here: First, I focus on
express reference and not underlying belief, because if one is willing
to translate one's religious belief into secular terms, the problem of
perceived exclusion from debate disappears. (I am assuming we can
limit a legal as well as moral duty.
29. For arguments fleshing out these points, see Abner S. Greene, The
Incommensurability of Religion, in Law & Religion: A Critical Anthology 226
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder
to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of
the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L.J. 1611 (1993).
30. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968).
2004] 2095
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
account for apparently pretextual translation.) Here, my view is
similar to Rawls's "proviso." Second, our courts should invalidate
laws that are based in expressly religious argumentation only if such
argumentation dominated the legislative process. We should not be
opposed to participants in that process voicing their religious
arguments, so long as secular arguments become the dominant ones
for the law.
If we deem it necessary, as I believe we should, to limit religious
arguments in lawmaking in this way and for this reason, then those
who want to offer such arguments expressly as the predominant
ground for legislation have been disadvantaged compared to others
who are happy to offer secular grounds. The political participation of
religious folk has, accordingly, been muted to some degree. Since, in
a liberal democracy, we deem it a necessary (though almost certainly
not a sufficient) condition for legitimate political rule that citizens be
afforded an equal opportunity to participate in the political process, it
is not legitimate to demand full compliance from those to whom we
have denied equal participation. If we are to impose even a limited
gag rule on religious arguments, then we must offset that with a
limited system of exit options. Since actual physical emigration is not
reasonably available, we must instead provide representations of exit.
This can come through either judicially awarded exemptions, if the
cost of the exemption is not too high to other members of society, or
through legislatively crafted accommodations. In either way,
government can acknowledge its sovereignty as permeable rather than
plenary, which is only fair given its partial silencing of those who
would offer religious grounds for law.
III. A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS'S CONCEPTION OF PUBLIC REASON
In my judgment, Rawls's treatment of public reason is deficient on
three grounds: it excludes all comprehensive doctrines; it fails to
attend to the legitimacy costs from even a partial gag rule; and its
claim to be part of a theory of political rather than comprehensive
liberalism falls short.
A. It Excludes All Comprehensive Doctrines
Rawls seeks to exclude arguments based on any comprehensive
doctrine from justifying fundamental political decisions.31 He is
31. Rawls seems to claim that what matters is how political argumentation is
actually expressed, rather than underlying beliefs. See Rawls, Political Liberalism,
supra note 7, at 66-71, 242-43, 250 n.39. This focus is correct, because the reason for
excluding certain types of argument from justifying law is the exclusionary and
polarizing effect that a sectarian argument can have. If arguments are translated into
commonly accepted terms, then it does not matter that those advancing them might
believe in sectarian views of the good to back up those arguments. See Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra note 29, at 1620-23.
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unclear, though, about precisely why we might want to exclude any
argument from political justificatory practice. He suggests that the
liberal principle of legitimacy allows arguments that citizens "can
reasonably be expected to endorse,"32 but excludes as coercive laws
seen as sectarian, which are based on contested theories of the good.33
He consistently maintains, in a later work, that "the knowledge and
ways of reasoning... that ground the parties' selection of the
principles of justice must be accessible to citizens' common reason.""
It is not clear, however, why the majority cannot enact laws by
following, say, Milton Friedman over John Maynard Keynes, or Kant
over Bentham, so long as the laws don't violate specific rights. In
other words, Rawls never makes clear what he believes are the
predicates to legitimate governmental coercion. Perhaps the Rawlsian
principle of exclusion is this: Express references to controversial
theories of the good may not justify law because citizens who do not
themselves believe the winning theories will feel as though they are
living under law that doesn't equally respect their theories of the
good.
It is not clear, however, why this is so or why, if so, it should be
considered problematic. So long as the laws do not restrict freedom of
speech or belief or restrict political participation, the losing citizens on
a particular issue have every opportunity to seek to persuade the
winning group of its error. And even if the victory of, say, Friedman
over Keynes signals (as all political victories do) that the law favors
some citizens' views over others', why should this be a problem for
political liberalism? Why isn't it simply another way of describing
politics? Liberalism consistently can allow great space for all citizens
to pursue their notions of the good while adopting laws that are
grounded in particular comprehensive doctrines, so long as we have
protections for certain rights that are necessary for the pluralistic
pursuit of the good. In this way, a blend of liberalism and
republicanism is possible.
A better rule of exclusion would allow as justifications for law
arguments that are based in sources that all citizens have access to as
citizens, but would exclude as justifications for law arguments based in
authority to which only some citizens have access. Imagine, for a
moment, a group of citizens that has access to a box that contains
evidence supporting a certain argument for a particular law. Suppose
that group relies in the political process on the contents of that box
but denies other citizens access to the box and its contents. We should
bar such shenanigans from justifying law because some citizens have
access to the source of authority backing the law, while others are
32. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 225; see id. at xx, 134, 136-37,
216-17.
33. See id. at 136-37, 143-44, 217, 225, 243.
34. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 90 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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excluded from that source of authority. The excluded group rightly
feels that it has not been treated equally; its members reasonably feel
that they are second-class citizens.
So we should ask: Are there any types of argument that are similar
to the secret-box hypothetical? Rawls offers no reason to assume that
all arguments based in comprehensive views of the good
(philosophical, moral, or religious) are similarly exclusionary. I might
not agree with Milton Friedman's economic theory, but when
confronted with arguments based in that theory, I know I can
participate as a full citizen in trying to argue that Friedman is wrong,
that another theory is correct, and that a certain law does or does not
follow from Friedman's theory. But express reference to religious
doctrine-understanding religious reference to be to an extrahuman
source of normative authority-is like the secret-box model and
unlike the Friedman example. To be sure, religious reference might
be similar to nonreligious philosophical or moral reference in many
ways-all might be seen as to some degree nonrational or based in
faith; all might be controversial or divisive; and all might invoke
sources of authority that compete with that of the state. Only
religious reference, however, relies on a source of normative authority
that is claimed by its proponents to be beyond the scope of human
experience and to be based in special relationships that the believers
have with that source of authority and that other citizens might not
have.
B. It Fails to Attend to the Legitimacy Costs from Even a Partial Gag
Rule
Rawls advances broad principles of political exclusion, sweeping
gag rules that would limit in the lawmaking process reliance on
sectarian theories of the good. But he fails to acknowledge that these
rules of exclusion delegitimate the government's claim to the
obedience of its citizens. Although theories of the good that some
people hold at the core of their being have been barred from justifying
law, Rawls apparently believes that these people nonetheless must
obey law just as if they had participated fully in the political process-
at least, there's no indication that he believes otherwise.
This view, however, is in tension with a cardinal principle of liberal
democracy, namely that a necessary (although not a sufficient)
condition for political legitimacy is the ability of citizens (who are
sovereign) to participate equally in the political process. If we took
away someone's voting rights, or speech or press or petition rights,
and then demanded that she obey all laws, there would be an obvious
and serious legitimacy problem (as there is with obligating aliens and
prisoners, who lack some of these rights). Why should the legitimacy
problem be any less severe if we bar people from advancing in politics
2098 [Vol. 72
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theories of the good that they hold to be true? Is such a gag rule not a
serious hindrance to political participation?
One would need a normative theory to justify beginning from a
baseline of common-ground politics rather than from a baseline of
politics that is open to all theories of the good. As I shall explain,
although I agree with Rawls that there are good reasons to create a
kind of common-ground politics, I disagree that common-ground
politics is the appropriate baseline, or starting point, for analyzing the
legitimacy question. Rather, I argue that the better premise is one
that acknowledges the capacity of all human beings to hold true
theories of the good. If we establish a politics that bars some of those
theories from justifying law, then to legitimate legal coercion of
citizens whose arguments have been gagged, we must compensate, to
some degree, for such exclusion, by relaxing the sweep of sovereignty
over those citizens in certain instances. In this way, a system of
permeable sovereignty can serve as the appropriate counterpoint to
common-ground politics.
C. Its Claim to Be Part of a Theory of Political Rather than
Comprehensive Liberalism Falls Short
Examining how Rawls casts his argument for common-ground
politics will reveal the way in which he fails to attend to the legitimacy
problem that common-ground politics creates. To fix ideas, let us
understand "political liberalism" as a political conception of justice
that seeks to achieve an overlapping consensus of reasonable, varying
comprehensive doctrines through the use of public reason.
Importantly, political liberalism is agnostic as to the claims of the
varying comprehensive doctrines about the good, including the claim
that all citizens have access to the true moral order. Political
liberalism is open to the possibility that all citizens do not have access
to the true moral order-that, instead, a particular sectarian view of
the good is correct. Let us understand "comprehensive liberalism" to
be similar to political liberalism in seeking to establish the centrality
of toleration for competing theories of the good, but as differing from
political liberalism in claiming that such toleration is itself good-that
is, that all citizens do have access to the true moral order, and that a
sectarian view to the contrary is simply wrong. Rawls claims
throughout Political Liberalism that he is describing a political rather
than a comprehensive liberalism. 5 This claim, however, is in tension
with other aspects of Rawls's argument and helps to show how Rawls
ignores the legitimacy problem that follows from excluding certain
arguments from the lawmaking process.
To see that Rawls's argument is in fact more consistent with a
35. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at xx, xxix, 9, 95, 99, 138, 150,
194-95.
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version of comprehensive liberalism, consider two different premises
from which one might approach the legitimacy problem. First, one
could start from the premise that all arguments are fair game in
politics. I will call this the "fair-game" premise. This does not mean
that we would, in the end, allow all arguments into politics. As I have
suggested above, certain arguments might rely on privileged access to
a source of normative authority that would exclude other citizens if
allowed to justify law. If certain arguments are excluded from politics,
however, then under the fair-game premise a legitimacy problem
would arise, because we would treat people as second-class citizens by
coercing them through law after excluding their arguments from
justifying law. Some form of compensation for such a harm would be
required.
One could approach the legitimacy problem from a different
premise, which I will call the "common-ground" premise. Here, one
could exclude sectarian theories of the good from grounding law,
without the concomitant need to attend to the harm done to those
whose comprehensive views are so excluded, because unlike the fair-
game premise, the common-ground premise assumes not that all
arguments are prima facie fair game in politics, but rather that some
arguments-those based on privileged, sectarian reference-are prima
facie off limits in politics.
Rawls's theory of legitimacy is clearly the second one, based in the
common-ground premise. He never claims that there's a legitimacy
problem in excluding arguments from politics; he argues only that a
legitimacy problem would arise if we failed to exclude certain
arguments from politics. Although he claims that this theory of
legitimacy is consistent with a political rather than a comprehensive
liberalism, this seems questionable. The fair-game premise, rather
than the common-ground premise, seems to fit better with political
liberalism, because it takes seriously (by requiring compensation for
the exclusion of arguments from politics) the possibility that one or
more comprehensive doctrines might be true. A cogent political
liberalism-acknowledging the possibility that common-ground
politics might fail to bring about the best moral order, leaving open
the theoretical chance that a sectarian theory of the good is in fact
best-would recognize the legitimacy problem that flows from
silencing certain theories of the good in politics.
It might be thought that because all comprehensive doctrines, in
Rawls's view, should be excluded from political justificatory practice,
such exclusion treats all citizens equally and no compensation is
needed. That is, even if one adopts the fair-game premise of
legitimacy, perhaps so long as all citizens are treated the same, none
becomes a second-class citizen and no compensation is needed for the
exclusion. On this view, only theories that selectively exclude certain
comprehensive doctrines create two tiers of citizens. Perhaps this is a
[Vol. 722100
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point against selective exclusions, or perhaps it means that in a system
of selective exclusions some form of compensation is necessary to
ameliorate the legitimacy problem. That is not the issue here,
however. Rather, by contrasting selective exclusions with Rawls's
refusal to allow any comprehensive doctrine to serve as the express
justification for law, perhaps we can see that Rawls has solved the
legitimacy problem by attempting to treat all citizens alike.
Rawls's theory, however, does not treat all citizens alike, and Rawls
admits as much.3 6 Some comprehensive doctrines will hold a view of
the good that is consistent with a rule of excluding references to such
doctrines from justifying law; other comprehensive doctrines will find
it inconsistent with their views of the good to adopt such rules of
exclusion. Rawls's across-the-board rule of exclusion would have a
disparate impact on the latter group of comprehensive doctrines, thus
effectively favoring the former group. Rawls acknowledges the
disparate impact of his theory of locating an overlapping consensus
through public reason.37 He claims, however, that his theory neither
asserts nor denies any truth claim.38 He then gives the example of a
group that holds a certain view to be true and worth fighting for and
that believes salvation depends upon this. He responds: "At this
point we may have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply its
denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped to
avoid."39 Our response, however, would really be only an implication
of denial: "[W]e do not put forward more of our comprehensive view
than we think needed or useful for the political aim of consensus.
4
Later, Rawls makes a similar point when responding to the question
whether his conception of justice is fair to all conceptions of the good.
He argues that "[t]he principles of any reasonable political conception
must impose restrictions on permissible comprehensive views, and the
basic institutions those principles require inevitably encourage some
ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude them altogether.
41
Again, his point is that any political conception of justice produces a
disparate impact on some comprehensive doctrines. I agree that the
impact is incidental and not intentional, in the sense that Rawls is not
intending to assert the truth of liberalism. Rawls implies that this
absence of intentionality renders his theory a political rather than
comprehensive liberalism; he contrasts disparate impact with "the
state's advancing a particular comprehensive doctrine in its own
name."
42
36. See id. at 138, 152, 194-200.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 150.
39. Id. at 152; see also id. at 138.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 195.
42. Id.
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It is unclear, however, why intent should be dispositive here; in
either case, the effect of Rawls's theory is to favor certain
comprehensive doctrines over others without compensation. Let us
assume that we think foundational to political legitimacy a citizen's
ability to advance what she believes to be good consistently
throughout her life (including politics, if her view of the good so
requires). Then a theory of justice that in effect limits in politics
certain theories of the good (which, from the point of view of those
theories, may not properly be limited in politics) while remaining
consistent with other theories of the good (which, from the point of
view of those other theories, may properly be limited in politics)
creates a group of second-class citizens.
Rawls once again betrays that his (even post-Theory of Justice)
liberalism is a comprehensive one in Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement. In a section titled Political and Comprehensive
Liberalism: A Contrast, he first reiterates his argument from Political
Liberalism that a mere disparate impact on certain comprehensive
doctrines is not enough to render the overlapping consensus/public
reason conception of liberalism comprehensive.43 I have responded to
this above. He then gives an example of educating children whose
parents are members of religious sects, who wish to live separately
from the modern world. Rawls argues that political liberalism doesn't
require fostering "the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals
to govern much if not all of life."'  Rather, political liberalism "will
ask that children's education include such things as knowledge of their
constitutional and civic rights, .... to ensure that their continued
religious membership when they come of age is not based simply on
ignorance."45 That such an educational requirement might have the
effect of educating the children "to" a comprehensive liberal
conception does not render the effort one of comprehensive
liberalism, says Rawls. But Rawls does not address the more
important objection, from the parents: that the mere introduction of
certain values with which the parents disagree violates the parents'
religious rights to educate their children as they see fit.46 Now there
might indeed be good reasons to strip parents of a monopoly over
their children's education.47 But the argument for doing so must be
seen as an argument from a specific brand of comprehensive
43. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 34, at 154-56.
44. Id. at 156.
45. Id.
46. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 937 (1996).
47. See Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 477, 489-92 (2000) [hereinafter Greene, Civil Society]; Abner S.
Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional and Why They're Not, 13 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397, 406-08 (1999).
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liberalism.48  My position, generally, is that this form of
comprehensive liberalism is proper regarding children, for there are
good arguments for insisting on multiple repositories of power over a
child's education. To the contrary, when competent adults are the
subject of discussion, I believe we should revert to a true political
liberalism, which would acknowledge the possibility that they have
seen the truth through their own comprehensive doctrines. The way
to do this is through balancing a partial gag rule on religious
arguments in lawmaking against offsetting exemptions and
accommodations.
48. See Greene, Civil Society, supra note 47, at 487-89 (describing my exchange
with Jim Fleming and Linda McClain).
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